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In 2006, Michael Zimmerman published an underappreciated paper on the nature 
of moral obligation in which he argued that our moral obligations depend, not on the facts 
or our beliefs, but on the evidence available to us (see “Is Moral Obligation Objective or 
Subjective?” Utilitas 18, 2006, pp. 329-361). Two years later, he published a lengthy book 
in which he argued more thoroughly for the same conclusion (see Living with Uncertainty: 
The Moral Significance of Ignorance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)). 
In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, Zimmerman returns to the central question of those 
works to respond to objections that have been brought against the views he presented 
therein. Though not without its weaknesses, Zimmerman’s new book is the most thorough 
defense of what has come to be known as the Prospective View of moral obligation and as 
such is a must-read for those working in normative ethics narrowly construed. 
Ignorance and Moral Obligation is composed of five chapters. In the first, 
Zimmerman poses the book’s central question, “What ought one to do when one doesn’t 
know which of one’s options is best?” (p. 10), where ‘ought’ is supposed to express the 
concept of moral obligation and by ‘best’ Zimmerman means best with respect to what 
matters morally (so as not to assume consequentialism). Zimmerman then presents the four 
leading answers to that question. According to the Objective View, one ought to do what is 
best, even if one doesn’t know what that is. According to the Subjective View, one ought 
to do what one believes is best. According to the Prospective View, which is Zimmerman’s 
view, one ought to do what the evidence suggests is best. Finally, according to the 
Ambiguity View, there are multiple senses of ‘ought,’ even when ‘ought’ expresses moral 
obligation. On this view, although there are facts about what agents objectively ought to 
do, subjectively ought to do, and prospectively ought to do, there is no fact about what 
agents ought to do simpliciter, because there is simply no such notion. At the end of chapter 
one, Zimmerman sets the Ambiguity View aside. Although he (hesitantly) admits that there 
might be multiple senses of moral obligation, he indicates that he is interested in the sense 
of moral obligation with which normative ethicists have traditionally been interested, 
which he claims is the sense of moral obligation that is “of ultimate concern to the 
conscientious person” (p. 33). 
In chapter two, Zimmerman argues that there are two constraints that the correct 
theory of moral obligation must meet, that neither the Objective nor the Subjective View 
can meet them, and that the Prospective View, which can meet them, is therefore superior. 
In particular, Zimmerman argues that the Subjective View fails because it rules out the 
possibility that agents could be wrong about what they are morally obligated to do. Then 
he argues that the Objective View fails because it entails that one who believes that it is 
the correct theory of moral obligation will sometimes have to violate its dictates (i.e., do 
what the theory entails is wrong) in order to act conscientiously.  
As evidence for this latter claim, Zimmerman presents a case based on a well-
known example conceived by Frank Jackson (see “Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism 
and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” Ethics 101, 1991, pp. 462-463). A doctor, Jill, 
must decide how to treat the skin condition of her patient, John. She has three drugs 
available. She knows that one will completely cure his condition, that one will partially 
cure his condition, and that one will kill him. Unfortunately, however, although she knows 
which of the three drugs will partially cure John’s condition, she does not know, for either 
of the remaining two drugs, whether it will cure him or kill him. Assuming that it is best to 
completely cure John’s condition and that Jill knows this, then if Jill believes the Objective 
View, she will believe that prescribing the drug that will only partially cure John’s 
condition is wrong. But, intuitively, if she is to act conscientiously, then she must prescribe 
the drug that will only partially cure John’s condition since prescribing either of the others 
would be too risky. Thus, those who believe the Objective View will sometimes have to 
violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously. 
In chapter three, Zimmerman clarifies the Prospective View and responds to 
objections to it, the most notable of which was raised by Holly Smith (see “The 
‘Prospective View’ of Obligation,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Discussion 
Note, 2011, pp. 5-8). According to Smith’s objection, the Prospective View is no different 
from the Objective View in that it entails that agents who believe it will sometimes have 
to violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously.  
To illustrate this, Smith presents a case similar to Jackson’s. But whereas Jackson’s 
example reveals that acting conscientiously sometimes requires one to do what one knows 
is suboptimal, Smith’s example reveals that acting conscientiously sometimes requires one 
to do what one knows the evidence available to one suggests is suboptimal. Therefore, if 
Zimmerman is correct that those who believe the correct theory of moral obligation will 
never have to violate its dictates in order to act conscientiously, then the Prospective View, 
as Zimmerman formulated it in his earlier works on moral obligation, must be false. 
In light of Smith’s objection, Zimmerman acknowledges that he must modify the 
way he formulated the Prospective View in his earlier works. Whereas before he 
understood the Prospective View as maintaining that one is morally obligated to do what 
the evidence available to one suggests is best, he now understands it as maintaining that 
one is morally obligated to do what the evidence one possesses suggests is best. Once we 
modify the Prospective View in this way, it is no longer vulnerable to this objection. 
In chapters four and five, Zimmerman explores how his views on the nature of 
moral obligation bear on two other debates. In chapter four, he argues that no theory of 
moral obligation can be supplemented with a principle of action guidance that is more 
practicable than the theory itself, and in chapter five, he argues that our moral rights depend 
on the evidence that others have. 
Given how much ground Zimmerman covers, there are a number of places where 
one might object his arguments, but I will focus my attention on the most obvious weakness 
in his argument for the Prospective View. As mentioned above, Zimmerman’s argument 
for the Prospective View depends on his argument against the Objective View, and that 
argument depends on the claim that acting conscientiously rules out deliberately doing 
what one believes to be morally wrong (pp. 32-33). Zimmerman calls this Constraint #2 
and shows that its truth entails the falsity of the Objective View by presenting the first case 
above. While Zimmerman does not provide an argument for Constraint #2, it does seem 
plausible, and Zimmerman leverages its plausibility against the Objective View.  
Although there is nothing, in principle, wrong with this strategy, I worry that 
Constraint #2 is not sufficiently compelling to stop proponents of the Objective View from 
taking the opposite tack – that is, leveraging their reasons for holding the Objective View 
against Constraint #2, leaving the two sides at an impasse. Having said that, I think there 
are a couple of things Zimmerman could have done to make this way of responding to his 
argument less attractive. First, he could have provided an argument for Constraint #2. Or, 
if that was not possible, he could have identified other, more plausible constraints on the 
correct theory of moral obligation that, like Constraint #2, entail the falsity of the Objective 
View. For example, the claim that an individual does not deserve punishment unless he or 
she has violated a moral obligation (together with plausible auxiliary premises) entails the 
falsity of the Objective View, and it is, to my mind, more plausible than Constraint #2. 
Additionally, Zimmerman could have spent more time undercutting the reasons people 
have for holding the Objective View in the first place. Either of those changes would have 
made his argument for the Prospective View more convincing. 
In the end, however, the book’s virtues far outweigh its shortcomings. It is clear 
and concise, especially given its impressive breadth and depth, and the arguments 
Zimmerman raises and responds to will be both interesting and challenging to anyone with 
a particular view of the nature of moral obligation. 
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